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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Insurance-Applicability of Statute Giving
Right of Direct Action Against Insurer for Negligence of Insured to
Policies Issued in Another State-A Louisiana resident brought suit
in a Louisiana federal court against a New York insurance company, under
a Louisiana statute allowing direct action against an insurer without first
having to get judgment against the insured, irrespective of the terms of
the insurance contract. Plaintiff had been injured by the alleged negligence of a Massachusetts gun manufacturer, insured by defendant under
a policy delivered in New York, and containing a clause forbidding direct
action against the insurer, valid by New York law. The insurer pleaded
that the statute was unconstitutional insofar as it was applicable to out-ofstate policies containing "no action" clauses which were valid by the laws
of the states in which the insurance contract was made. The plea was
dismissed on the grounds that the statute was procedural only, and its
application to out-of-state policies did not violate either the "due process"
or the "full faith and credit" clauses of the Constitution. Bouis v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D.La. 1950).
Under the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins,' the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must follow
the law of the state in which the court sits in all "substantive" matters,
while in "procedural" matters the Federal Rules apply. Federal courts
have decidedly tended, where there is the slightest doubt, to label matters
"substantive" and apply state law 2 The Supreme Court has specifically
labeled choice-of-law rules "substantive" under the Erie doctrine; 3 thus a
federal court, when faced with a conflict between the laws of different
states, must adopt the rule of the state in which it sits in solving the conflict. 4

Under the rules for the conflict of laws, if suit is brought in one

state on a contract made in another, the court must apply the foreign law
on all "substantive" matters, and its own law on matters of "procedure."
Whether a matter is substantive or procedural is for the forum court to
decide by its own rules, 5 although some courts determine the character of
a foreign law by adopting the ruling of the foreign state." Under these
1. 309 U.S. 64 (1938); see New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d

767 (5th Cir. 1948).

2. See Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test to Determine Those Rules of
State Law to Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 So. CALIF. L. REV. 204, 206-209 (1950).
3. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
4. As to the wisdom of the Klaxon decision, note 3 supra, see Cook, The
Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 493, 504, 511-515 (1942).
5. RESTATEmENT,

CONFLICT OF

LAWS

§ 584

(1934);

GOODRICH,

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS 226-229 (3d ed. 1949).
6. Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d
836 (1946) ; see Recent Case, 31 MINN. L. REv. 492 (1947).
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general rules, Louisiana courts have held the Louisiana direct action
statutes 7 to be procedural in ahlost all cases, whether the question was
one of retroactivity,8 or the issuance of the policy in another state.9 The
present court had no power to review the wisdom of the label placed by
the Louisiana state courts; under the Erie doctrine the field of conflict and
choice of law is substantive, and the court was obliged to accept the state
ruling that, within the field of conflicts, the statute in question is procedural.
The only limitations on the freedom of a state court to label a matter
substantive or procedural, and thus on the obligation of a federal court to
accept that label under the Erie doctrine, are constitutional ones. Prior
to 1938 the Supreme Court frequently reversed state choice-of-law decisions, sometimes on the full faith and credit clause,' 0 and sometimes on
the due process clause. 1 These cases displayed little consistency; the only
possible standard evidenced was that where the forum state had only a
slight interest in refusing to enforce foreign law there may be constitutional objections, but where the forum state had a substantial interest its
decisions would not be overturned.12 Since the Erie decision the Court
has paid little attention to constitutional objections, on the apparently nowdominant theory that choice-of-law problems are local matters, and states
are free to determine their own public policy. It seems that the refusal
of a state to enforce foreign law or a foreign contract because contrary to
local public policy will not be upset on constitutional grounds.' s
In the present case the court was restricted to a consideration of the
constitutional objections. 14 In view of the broad leeway given state courts
to decide choice-of-law problems by recent Supreme Court decisions, it is
extremely doubtful that that Court would sustain constitutional objections
in the present case. Even if viewed in the light of the Court's attitude
prior to 1938,15 such objections could not be sustained. Louisiana has a
substantial interest in permitting direct action against an insurer on an
7. LA.

REv. STAT.,

tit. 22, §§ 655, 983 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1950, Nos. 541,

542.
8. Rossville Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 18 La.
App. 725, 138 So. 183 (1931). If a statute is merely procedural it may take
retroactive effect.
9. Rogers v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. La. 1945).
10. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
11 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143 (1934), Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
12. See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in
the Field of Conflicts of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REv. 533, 559-562 (1926).
13. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), Sampson v. Channel, 110 F.2d
754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940). See also Pink v. A.A.A.
Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941). But cf. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
14. It is noteworthy that the federal court for Louisiana's Eastern District has
apparently either disregarded the doctrine of the Erie and Klaxon cases, or found
serious constitutional objections in applying the direct action statute to out-of-state
policies. See Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 89 F. Supp. 736
(E.D. La. 1950), Wheat v. White, 38 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1941).
15. Note 12, supra.
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out-of-state policy without the necessity of prior judgment against the
insured. The statute enables Louisianians injured by transient motorists
to sue the motorist's insurer in Louisiana, if he is doing business there,
without first having to spend time and money tracing the insured to his
16
It is a benefit similar to the one conhome state and suing him there.
ferred by statutes which provide that motorists entering a state appoint a
state official as agent to receive service of process for them. It is true
that the insurer is thereby deprived of his freedom from direct suit, and
must go before unsympathetic juries, but it has been pointed out that in
7
Theoretically, direct action
Louisiana juries rarely sit on civil cases.'
statutes do not affect the eventual liability of the insurer for the negligence
of the insured.' 8 It is submitted that, on the practical level, there is a
substantial interest on the part of Louisiana sufficient at the very least to
dispose of constitutional objections.

Criminal Law-Possibility of an Indictment for Assault with
Intent to Commit Adultery-Defendant got into the front seat of a
car close beside a married woman, took her into his arms, made a preliminary display of his affections upon her and then importuned her to
have sexual relations with him. She refused. Taking this rebuff in good
part, he desisted from any further attempts upon her person.' Notwith-2
standing this innocuous termination of the affair, defendant was charged
with assault with intent to commit adultery under the Michigan statute
which makes any assault with intent to commit a felony, a felony in its
own right.8 Defendant demurred to the charge, thus raising the question
of whether the crime was possible in law. He argued that since adultery
required the consent of the female, it was inconceivable that he should have
committed any assault. The trial court sustained this view; but on appeal
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that adultery did not require the
consent of the woman and that therefore an assault with intent to commit
16. See Rogers, note 9 supra, at 143.
17. See Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949 Ixs. L.J. 411, 414,
415 (1949).
18. See Rossville, note 8 supra, at 732-733.
1. The statement of facts, as given in the opinion of the Supreme Court, goes no
farther than those set forth above; and it is silent as to any prior acquaintance between the parties. Whether the woman did or did not consent, is, for the purposes
of demurrer, immaterial. It is hard to believe,- however, that she did not; and
therefore, regardless of the ruling in the instant case, it is doubtful that a conviction
could be sustained.
2. A first information was filed by the prosecutor but was later nolle prossed.
A second complaint was then signed by the husband of the woman involved. The
instant case comes up upon the second information.
3. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.282 (Henderson, 1938) provides that "any person
who shall assault another, with intent to commit any burglary, or any other
felony . . . shall be guilty of a felony . .
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it was philosophically possible. People v. Lipski, 43 N.W.2d 325 (Mich.
1950).
By the Common Law and by the law of most American jurisdictions, 4 an assault consists of any act which puts the victim into reasonable
apprehension of immediate physical harm, or which constitutes an attempt
to do bodily injury, coupled with an intent to do such bodily harm or to
create such reasonable apprehension. 5 If, however, the victim consents
to such treatment, there can be no assault. In this connection, it is immaterial that the assailant hopes to gain the consent of his quarry, as long
as he does not in fact secure it; for if such a sanguine expectation were a
valid defense to a charge of assault, then a man might safely fondle the
person of a woman indefinitely, just as long as he could satisfy a jury that
he was hopeful of enticing her to have voluntary sexual connection with
him; and this is preposterous. Nevertheless, in the only previous holding
on the possibility of an assault with intent to commit adultery,6 it was so
held. In State v'. Archer 7 the Supreme Court of South Dakota ruled that
since adultery required the consent of the woman in that jurisdiction, 8 there
could not possibly be an assault with intent to commit it.9 The principles
of the law, however, would appear to be opposed to this view.
In the light of the foregoing, it emerges that, while the result in thq
instant case is correct, its reasoning is at least unnecessarily narrow; for
even if adultery requires the consent of the woman, an assault with intent
to commit it is still possible. Where a man makes a substantive assault
upon a married woman and at the same time entertains a design to have
carnal knowledge of her, all the elements of the statutory crime,10 an
assault coupled with an ulterior intent, are present without more.
While the state of the law may be clear, its wisdom is doubtful. As
the dissenting justice in the instant case pointed out," there has never
4. MicH. STAT. AwN.

§

28.276,

for example, provides only that assault shall be

a misdemeanour, without specially defining the crime. The definition of the Common
Law is, therefore, in force.
5. For a welter of divergent views on the ingredients of assault at the Common
Law, amounting in sum to the above, see 2 BisHop, CRmIINAL LAWv § 23 (8th ed.
1892).
6. A search of all reported and indexed cases has revealed but one involving

assault with intent to commit adultery and none on the practically indentical (for
this purpose) crimes of assault with intent to commit incest or assault with intent
to commit fornication.
7. 22 S.D. 137, 115 N.W. 1075 (1908).
8. There is a split upon whether or not Adultery requires the consent of the
female. The better view is, as decided in the instant case, that it does not. See
BISHOP, STATUTORY CRimEs § 660 (3d ed., Early, 1901).
9. The result attained was nominally based upon the language used in the
statute, (now) SOUTH DAKOTA CODE § 13.2401 (1939), which requires that an assault
be a "willful and unlawful attempt or offer, with force and violence, to do a corporal
hurt to another." An intent to commit adultery, said the Court, was inconsistent
with the requirement of an intended use of "force and violence." The distinction
between this statutory definition and that given in the text above is difficult to perceive, however.
10. Aggravated assaults of the type denominated "assault with intent to commit
a felony" are indictable only under special statutory provisions, not by the Common

Law.
11. Instant case at 328.
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been devised a legal cudgel better adapted to the practice of the old "badger
game." 12 After this decision the most innocuous "sucker" may find that
his innocent "petting party" with the "come-on" has exposed him to a
serious criminal prosecution, or, what is equally effective, to the threat
of it.13 Such a proceeding is especially dangerous to the accused in view of
the notorious difficulty of disproving a sexual charge.14 Nor is it any
rebuttal to say that this remote possibility of blackmail by prosecution is
outweighed by the fact that the recognition of this crime should give
positive support to the sanctity of matrimony, for almost nowhere is any
serious effort made to punish minor sexual offenses. 15 The instant case,
while it reaches the logical result, should serve as a warning to the legislatures that they have created a crime of dubious wisdom, better suited to
misuse than to any other purpose.

Income Tax-Deductibility-Alimony Payments-A property
settlement incident to a divorce decree provided that husband pay wife
$100 per week until her death or remarriage, and make her the irrevocable '
beneficiary of certain life insurance policies in order to secure these payments in the event of his death. The premiums paid on these policies
were held not deductible from his gross income under 23(u) of the
Internal Revenue Code.2 Blumenthal v. Comn'r., 183 F.2d 15 (3rd Cir.

1950).
Section 23(u)

3

of the Internal Revenue Code allows the husband to

deduct payments from his gross income which are includible in the gross
12. The "badger game" is an extortion racket which has traditionally utilized
the threat of a widely-publicized suit for alienation of affections in order to force a
cash payment from a wealthy sucker. The instant case, which permits a serious
criminal prosecution to be founded upon a perfectly innocuous transaction, introduces
an even more effective legal bludgeon.
13. Out of the fifty-two jurisdictions, it appears that the crime of assault with
intent to commit adultery should be indictable in thirteen. Included are: Arizona,
Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and the District of Columbia.
The punishment provided for the crime typically ranges up to five years in the
penitentiary, a serious matter. See, e.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.282 (Henderson,
1938) and SouTH DAKOTA CODE § 13.2303 (1939).
14. See annotations in 60 A.L.R. 1124 (1929) and 130 A.L.R. 1489 (1941).
15. See MAY, SOCIAL CONTROL OF SEX EXPRESSION, C. XIII. The author cites
the following example: In New York City, where the sole ground for divorce is
Adultery, 1503 divorces were granted in a year. Yet only ten prosecutions for
adultery were initiated.
1. Irrevocable, however, only during her unmarried life. The trust company had
custody of the policies, and was instructed to pay the wife $5200 yearly from them,
after the death of her husband, as long as she lived and remained single. After her
death, or remarriage or in the event she predeceased her former spouse, other beneficiaries were designated by petitioner.
2. Affirming, Meyer Blumenthal, 13 T.C. 28 (1949).
3. INT. REV. CODE § 23(u).
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income of his former wife, and Section 22(k) 4 of the Act provides that
periodic payments received by a wife in compliance with a legal obligation
imposed on the husband by a decree of divorce, are includible in the gross

income of the wife. Prior to the instant decision, insurance premiums
paid by the husband were held deductible from his gross income, although

the wife received no immediate cash benefif from the policies.5

These

decisions reasoned that the wives constructively received the amounts paid

as premiums. The instant decision and subsequent decisions 6 holding
that the amounts paid as premiums were only security for alimony payments, and not constructive payments to the wives seem to depart from
the heretofore existing law.

Things "constructively received"

7

are those

which are unqualifiedly subject to the demand of the recipient, whether
or not actually received, 8 but the mere statement of this rule is of little
value since cases concerning constructive receipt are essentially factual
and prior decisions are of no great benefit as guideposts. 9 Although it was

not explicit in the opinions, all the cases, including this and those subsequent involving the deductibility of insurance premiums have a common
ground. Where the wives might never have received any benefits from
the insurance policies, there was no constructive receipt but only a security
transaction. 10 If the wives were assured benefits from the policies, either

because they or their heirs in any event would be the beneficiary of the
policies," or because they could reduce the amount of the policy and

2
divert a part of the cash premium which they in turn received in cash,'
they were regarded as having constructively received the money. In the
instant case the premiums were held non-deductible since she was to
receive no benefit unless husband predeceased her and sh remained unmarried. 13
A conflict of policy will arise in determining whether courts should
allow a deduction by the husband under the "constructive receipt" theory,
or decide that the insurance is only a form of security to the wife and

4. INT. REv, CoDE § 22(k).

5. Boies C. Hart, 11 T.C. 16 (1948); See also Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C.
195 (1947); Leon Mandel, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. ff 16,964 (1949).
6. Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14 T.C. No. 154 (June 30, 1950); William
J. Gardner, 14 T.C. No. 167 (June 30, 1950).
7. See 2 MERTENs, TAXATION 1 (1942).
8. Ross v. Comnm'r., 169 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948).
9. C. H. Becker, 14 T.C. 361, 366 (1950).
10. See cases cited notes 2, 6 supra.
11. See Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, supra, at p. 9; Anita Quinby Stewart,
supra.
12. See Boies C. Hart, supra. Husband was obligated to pay wife 38.5%y of
his income, out of which husband was to pay the premiums on the insurance. If the
amount of the policy was reduced, the cash surrender value of such insurance would
inure to the benefit of the husband, but would also increase the cash payments each
year to the wife.
13. If this factual distinction is not adopted by the courts, then no prediction
as to the disposition of future cases will be possible, creating an uncertain area of
the law, i.e., whether premium payments made by a divorced husband on insurance
are deductible from his gross income.
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therefore premiums are not deductible. Sections 22(k) and 23(u) of
the Internal Revenue Code were written so that divorced husbands in the
high tax brackets would not be subject to a tax on their entire income,
coupled with payments to their wives, almost equal or exceeding their total
income. 14 Although alimony insurance premiums would not approach
the large direct alimony payments envisioned by the act this undesirable
result might occur if subsequent cases follow the instant case, as seems to
be indicated. Yet the intent of Congress was to have the wife include this
payment in her gross income only if the amount was unqualifiedly subject
to her demand.15 Recognizing that either the husband or wife must
suffer an inequity, it appears fairer to tax the husband, because if the wife
were taxed solely on a contingency, and later remarried or predeceased
her former spouse, she would never receive any benefits under the policy.
Although an opposite result would occur if the husband predeceased the
wife, the court is not to question the wisdom of the legislature, and only
16
legislative action can correct this inconsistency.

Labor Law-Power of Courts to Issue Mandamus to a National
Labor Union to Compel Reinstatement of a Suspended Local Union
President-Plaintiff, president of a local union was suspended from
membership in the union as a result of his failure to comply with the
national president's order to put an end to a local wildcat strike. Suspension was tantamount to a deprivation of plaintiff's ability to carry on
his highly skilled trade, because the union had widespread closed shop
agreements. Plaintiff pursued his intra-union remedies, the final step
being an appeal to the national convention of the union, where he appeared
personally before the appeal and grievance committee which reported his
case to the convention floor. Failing there, he then initiated an action at
law and secured both damages for his wrongful expulsion and a writ of
mandamus directing his reinstatement to union membership. On appeal,
this ruling was affirmed on the grounds that the proceedings before the
national convention were contrary to concepts of "natural justice" and
"fairplay," in that plaintiff was not permitted to plead his case personally
on the convention floor. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n of United
States and Canada, 220 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1950).
Because labor unions are unincorporated associations, the law governing the internal affairs of unions is basically the same set of rules applied in
14. Howard, Recent Tax Court Decisions in Section 22(k) Cases, 7 NAT. B.J.
398 (1949).
15. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1942).
16. For those who desire "tax safety," it would be well to pay the wife enough
to enable her to meet the premiums and let the actual payment thereof up to her.
This payment would clearly be constructively received by the wife.
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the case of any unincorporated club, or fraternity. There is a well established reluctance on the part of courts to interfere in membership disputes
of unincorporated associations, because it is felt that by joining the association, the member has subjected himself to its rules. Further, an association requires wide discretion in setting its membership qualifications and
disciplining members, if it is to function efficiently. Bound by this "fraternity" law, an expelled union member cannot bring his grievance into a court
of law unless he has first exhausted his intra-union remedies, 2 though some
courts have dispensed with this requirement in the appropriate situation. 3
Then, the member must show that his case falls within one of the well
defined exceptions, growing out of "fraternity" law, which will permit
judicial interference. Courts will generally intervene where expulsion has
been effected through fraud, malice or bad faith. 4 Deprivation of property
rights, as a result of expulsion, usually found in impairment of the member's earning ability due to the fact that the union in question has closed
shop agreements, will lead to judicial intervention,5 as will an expulsion
contrary to the union constitution and by-laws. 6 The greatest degree of
judicial interference is manifested by those courts which will reinstate a
member where the expulsion is found violative of "natural justice." 7 In
applying that standard to the case at hand, the court made no attempt to
define the limits of its application. Apparently, an expulsion will be found
contrary to concepts of natural justice, when the courts wish to exert some
measure of regulation over union control of its own membership and are
unable to fit it into the more orthodox grounds for intervention.,
It is anomalous to apply rules primarily adapted to social organizations
to labor unions. Expulsion from social organizations is not nearly so
1. 1 TEILER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 291 (1940).
2. Baltimore Lodge v. Grand Lodge, 134 Md. 355, 106 AtI. 692 (1919); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §811, Comment a, (1939).
3. Cameron v. International &c. Union, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 691 (1935)
(application not required where union action was against public policy) ; see Malloy
v. Carrol, 274 Mass. 524, 537, 172 N.E. 790, 795 (1930) (control of executive board
by opposing faction of the union precluded success of appeal).
4. Pratt v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 50 Utah 472, 167 Pac. 830 (1917) ; see Donnelly
v. Supreme Council, 106 Md. 425,67 Ati. 276 (1907) ; Stivors v. Blethen, 124 Wash.
473,215 Pac. 7 (1923) ; Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit,
43 HARv. L. REv. 993 (1930).
5. Nissen v. International Brotherhood, 229 Iowa 1028,1048, 295 N.W. 858,864
(1941); Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 435, 139 N.E. 629,631 (1933); c.f.
O'Brien v. Musical Mutual P. & B. Union, 64 N.J. Eq. 525, 54 Atl. 150 (1903).
6. Local Union v. Nalty, 7 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1925); see Otto v. Journeymen
Tailor's Protective and Benevolent Union, 75 Cal. 308,314,17 Pac. 217,219 (1888).
7. Otto v. Journeymen Tailor's Protective and Benevolent Union, supra, (failure
to give member an opportunity to explain his conduct) ; Sweetman v. Barrows, 263
Mass. 349, 161 N.E. 272 (1928) (member expelled for bringing suit inimicable to
union interests); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921)
(member signed petition to have a certain law favored by the union repealed);
Chafee, supra note 4 at 1015.
8. "Besides filling gaps in the rules, the courts will apply natural justice to
upset an express rule which is contrary thereto. The principle is thus a sort of unwritten 'due process' clause which invalidates the statutes of the association. Its
meaning is equally vague." Chafee, mpra note 4 at 1015.

700

[Vol. 99

UNIVERSITY. OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

damaging as expulsion from a labor union, carrying with it an impairment
of the member's opportunity for employment wherever the union has a
"stranglehold" on a particular industry by virtue of closed or union shop
agreements. 9 Courts and legislatures, recognizing the quasi-public nature
of unions have endeavored to apply different standards of regulation to
unions than ordinary unincorporated associations. Thus, in the leading
case of Coronado Co. v. U. M. Workers, 0 labor unions were held proper
parties to suit, in contrast to the common law rule that an unincorporated
association could not be sued as such, but that redress had to be had against
the individual members.11 Full recognition of the fact that unions were
subject to different rules was manifested in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Ry. Co.,' 2 which denied a union the power to make a contract discriminatory
to a particular minority. The most sweeping inroads in the non-interference doctrine is to be found in the Taft-Hartley Act which would seriously
curtail the absolute control of unions over membership and discipline. 13
Progressive state legislatures, realizing that the right to work "is next in
importance to the rights of life and liberty," 14 have enacted statutes which
infringe on the right of unions to limit membership to certain classes. 15
Despite these initial repudiations of the constrictions of "fraternity"
law in the area of labor relations, many courts find it difficult to surmount
traditional non-interference concepts in areas which call for interference.
The result has been the development of many abuses in the union judicial
process. In some unions, identity of the judicial board of the union with
the executive board has rendered the union remedy useless.16 Moreover,
in many cases, union judicial committees are unduly influenced by regional
factions within the union.17 Strong domination by the executives of the
judicial machine, very often discourages members from voicing grievances.' 8 In addition, the desire of unions to keep their disputes from
reaching the courts gives rise to arbitrary suppression of members' complaints.' 9 While these defects do exist, in a large measure, the arbitrary
9. "When an association has a stranglehold upon an industry .

.

.

internal

decisions upon other questions beside expulsion and admission may be of much public
concern." Chafee, supra note 4 at 1023.
10. 259 U.S. 344,385-392 (1921).
11. E.g. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165
Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905).
12. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
13. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (Supp. 1949).
14. Dissenting opinion of Swayne J. in The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wal.
36, 127 (U.S. 1872).
15. N.Y. CIVIL RIGH TS LAW § 43 (McKinney 1948) (constitutionality upheld
in Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 211.6
(Purd. 1941); see also RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§810, 811 (1939).
16. Chamberlain, The Judicial Process in Labor Unions, 10 BROOKLYN L. REV.,
145,162-63 (1941); Note, Disputes Within Trade Unions, 46 YALE LJ. 1248, 1255
(1936).
17. BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN AcroN, 55 (1948).
18. Chamberlain, supra note 16 at 163.
19. When questioned by Samuel Untermeyer before a congressional committee as
regards possible judicial intervention in union expulsion disputes, Samuel Gompers

gave vent to the traditional union attitude, exclaiming, "God, save labor from the
courts !", JOINT LEG. COMMITTEE ON HOUSING REP. (Lockwood Committee) (1923).
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nature of union government arises from a desire to preserve a strong internal structure for purposes of union action.20 This aim has seriously
curtailed union desire to extend a measure of democratic review to aggrieved union members. 21 But, it is possible for courts to give effect to
this union desire for internal discipline, and still relieve a great deal of the
inequity which does exist, without usurping the entire union judicial
machine. Called for, is a redefinition of the extent to which courts may
interfere in union membership disputes. Minimum guarantees of procedural fair play, such as notice and right to be heard and rebut, should be
prescribed and enforced. Such forthright recognition and delineation of
the extent to which the courts may inquire into the nature of the charges
against a particular member would eliminate the necessity of taking refuge
behind broad philosophical concepts.

Pensions-Impairment of Contractual Obligation-Vested Interest of a Government Employee in the Amount Provided-Georgia
enacted legislation in 1924 requiring municipalities to pay firemen who
retired after 25 years service at least $100 monthly for life.' Two percent
of the employees' wages were to finance in part the pension fund, and the
city treasury was to make up any deficit. A 1935 amendment reduced the
minimum to $75 monthly 2 which plaintiff received since retiring in 1942.
He now seeks to restore the original amount retroactively. The Georgia
Supreme Court, reversing a judgment dismissing the petition for insufficiency, held that plaintiff had a vested interest in the sum originally provided, wherefore the 1935 amendment was an impairment of a contractual
obligation forbidden by both state83 and Federal Constitutions.4 Bender v.
Anglin, 60 S.E.2d 756 (Ga. 1950).
An apparent majority of courts still adhere to the early doctrine that
public employee pensions may be changed or even revoked at will since a
lack of consideration renders them only gratuities or bounties springing
from the sovereign's benevolence. 5 Even compulsory wage deductions
20. BARBASr, op. cit. mtpra note 17 at 51-56.

21. Ibid at 57-58.
1. Ga. Laws 1924, No. 454, p. 167, as amended by Ga. Laws 1931, No. 137,
p. 223.
2. Ga. Laws 1935, No. 434, p. 450.
3. "All rights, privileges and immunities which may have vested in, or accrued
to, any person . . . under and in virtue of an act of the General Assembly . . .

shall be held inviolate by all courts . . ."

GA. CoNsT. Art. XII, § 1.

4. "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ." U.S. ConsT. Art. I, § 10.
5. Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937) ; Mell v. State, 130 Ohio

St. 306, 199 N.E. 72 (1935). See the exhaustive collections of cases in Notes, 54
A.L.R. 943 (1928), 98 A.L.R. 505 (1935), 112 A.L.R. 1009 (1938), 137 AL.R. 249
(1942) ; 40 Am. Jur. 981; 3 McQuiLLEn, op cit. su-pra. note 5, § 12.144.
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are not held to constitute consideration on the questionable theory that the
6
The results ancontributions never passed into the employee's control.
do
not materialize,
rule
this
harsh
of
application
ticipated from a rigorous
1
amendment
Rather,
pensions.
abolish
legislation
does
rarely
for
however,
cononerous
or
imposes
payments
diminishes
legislation
or substituted
ditions upon them.8 Where retirement antedates repeal, several of these
courts by-pass the problem of consideration, and declare, but apparently
by dictum only, that the pensioner's interest vests and is immune from
9
The same dearth of
statutory abrogation, but not from adjustment.
pure annulment, however, causes the distinction between these situations
to be without vitality. A minority of courts, at least one of which may
have been prompted to a higher regard for logic by state constitutional
10
achieve like results notwithprohibitions against legislative gratuities,
standing the finding of patent consideration in continuance in government
These treat the pension as delayed compensation, conemployment."
templated within the employment contract, and then imply a reserved
right of the state to alter the irrevocably vested interest. These conflicting
theories are probably more inconsistent in fancy than in fact, since both
lines of cases seem to reach the same practical result, i.e., a government
The theory seems to have originated with respect to military pensions, and carried
over into the public employee field. United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1882);
Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew. 387, 402 (Ala. 1831).
6. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 470-472 (1889) (since the government can
reduce the salary of the employee, this is only one manner of so doing); State v.
City of Tampa, 119 Fla. 556, 558, 159 So. 292, 293 (1934). Not even the amount
contributed may be recovered. McFeely v. Pension Commission of Hoboken, 8
N.J. Super. 575, 73 A.2d 757 (1950) ($3,084.22); Clarke v. Reis, 87 Cal. 543, 25
Pac. 759 (1891) ($256). Contra: Retirement Board v. McGovern, 316 Pa. 161, 169,
170, 174 Atl. 400, 405 (1934) (distinguishing pensions from annuities) ; Instant case
at 760.
7. Only one case was found in which it appeared that there was a complete revocation, and that was in a jurisdiction that rejects the majority rule. See note 12 infra.
8. Beutel v. Foreman, 288 Ill. 106, 123 N.E. 270 (1919) (requiring attainment
of the age of 50 years) ; Pecoy v. City of Chicago, 265 Ill. 78, 106 N.E. 435 (1914)
(extending length of service) ; Macfarland v. Bieber, 32 App. D.C. 513 (1909) (requiring periodical physical examinations).
9. State v. City of Tampa, .rpra (reducing $312.50 to $100) ; Gaffney v. Young,
200 Ia. 1030, 1033, 205 N.W. 865, 867 (1925) (the court expressly refused to consider
whether the legislature could modify).
10. "The legislature shall have no power to . . . make any gift . . .to any

individual . . . whatever . . ." CAL. CoNsT. Art. IV, §31. One pension system
was declared repugnant to this provision in Taylor v. Mott, 123 Cal. 497, 56 Pac.
256 (1899) and another not so in Odea v. Cook, 176 Cal. 659, 169 Pac. 366 (1917).
Georgia also has a similar constitutional provision, GA. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 16, and
the instant court at p. 760 discusses how undesirable the consequence of invalidating
the entire pension system by holding pensions to be gratuities. In Texas (TEx.
CONsT. Art. III, §51), such a provision may explain the ambiguous wording in
Dallas v. Trammel, 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W. 2d 1009 (1937), and again in Howerton
v. City of Fort Worth, 231 S.W. 2d 993 (1950).
11. Packer v. Board of Retirement, 217 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1950) ; Talbott v. Independent School District, 230 Ia. 949, 299 N.W. 556 (1941) ; Retirement Board v.
McGovern, mtpra. The only case of complete legislative abrogation found was
decided under this view. A pension payable after 20 years service was repealed
one month before plaintiff retired. Held for plaintiff, the theory being that although
reasonable alteration was permissible, complete abolition was not. Kern v. City of
Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 179 P.2d 799 (1947).
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may alter but not revoke a promised pension, thus striking a mean between
the threat of economic embarrassment to the state and the total loss of
promised benefits to the faithful worker. Now the instant case rejects the
classic rule, and marks the complete development of the minority view by
recognizing a vested interest wholly immune from change assuring the
employee of the highest sum promised him during employment.
Public employee pensions should be designed primarily to attract and
retain competent personnel,' 2 and to provide adequate old age assistance.' 3
Downward revision, or fear of it, endangers realization of both ends.
Sound pension systems avoid revision, but, like life insurance, are complex
and demand precise actuarial foundations. 14 Unfortunately, many systems,
appearing deceptively simple and inexpensive, are politically motivated and
thus hastily formulated, lacking that foundation. 15 A steady increase in
longevity and in the number of public employees causes more employees
to retire than pensioners to die in any year.16 Insolvency threatens the
pension fund, and courts, perhaps inherently loath to impose liability upon
the government, permit the widespread revision that politically wise legislatures prefer to public taxation.' 7 Possibly judicial myopia, exemplified
by one court's frank admission of inability to see how to exact full payment from insufficient funds,' 8 prevents courts from coercing legislative
adoption of the taxing alternative. Consequently, there is no incentive
to prod legislatures to rely upon statistics instead of conjecture. The
adjustment of pension rates may be as unscientific as the initial scheme,
and also require change.' 9 If flexibility in payments is desired, pension
amounts should be tied to the cost of living index, not to the straitened
finances of the fund. However, both this and the recommended actuarial
system demand general taxation and freedom from legislative tampering.
12. Cobbs v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 18 Ala. App. 206, 208, 91 So. 627,
629 (1921) ; Talbott v. Independent School District, supra at 963, 299 N.W. at 563.
See GiLMoRE, A SUGGESTED STATE-ADmINISTERED RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR MUNIcI-

PAL EMPLOYEES IN DELAWARE 10, 11 (1946); MERIAM, PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE
RETIREMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 3-17 (1918).
13. See MERIAM, op. cit. supra note 13 at Chapter I; GILMORE, op. cit. supra

note 13 at 11, 12.
14. See MERIAm, op. cit. supra note 13 at 62-63; GILMORE, op. cit. supra note
13 at 3, passim; STUDENSCY, THE PENSION PROBLEM 5 (1917) passim.
15. See MERIAM, op. cit. supra note 13 at vii-ix; STUDENSKY, op. cit. .supra
note 14 at 1, 2. It is well. to remember that not even an unsound plan will encounter
problems until payments are due, years after inception.
16. See MERIAm, op. cit. supra note 13 at i, ii; REPORT ON THE POLICE PENSION
FUND OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1913) (the first and largest police pension system in the United States). The latter illustrates the problems besetting the typical
fund in detail, and pages 15-34 are especially illuminating.
17. The entire field is analysed in the textual authorities cited in notes 13, 14 and
16 supra.
18. City of Dallas v. Trammel, supra at 163, 164, 101 S.W.2d at 1015, 1016,
discussed and distinguished on this point in the Instant case at p. 762.
19. "The provision of the charter was amended in 1923, 1929, 1937, 1942 and
1945, each amendment changing the basis upon which the amount was to be determined." Brown v. City of Highland Park, 320 Mich. 108, 110, 30 N.W.2d 798
(1948).
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Probably the best cure is furnished by the instant court, which, in binding
the legislature to its pronouncements, will force actuarial investigation
before legislation. Such pensions will fulfill their purpose, and eventually
benefit the government, the employee, and the public.

'Sales-Conflict of Laws-Effect of the Statute of Frauds of
Pennsylvania's Uniform Sales Act on the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act-Seller shipped buyer peas pursuant to an oral contract made in Pennsylvania. Buyer rejected and seller thereupon brought
proceedings before the Secretary of Agriculture under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act 1 for damages sustained through buyer's action.
Buyer defended on the ground that the contract, being oral, was barred
by the statute of frauds. The circuit court affirmed an award of reparations for the seller, holding inter alia2 that the Statute of Frauds of the
Uniform Sales Act of Pennsylvania 8 was inapplicable and only federal
law applied. Since there was no federal fraud provision or any clause in
the PACA relating to such requirements, there was no bar to the enforcement of an oral contract in a federal jurisdiction. Rothenberg v. H. Rothstein & Sons, 183 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1950).
The central issue of the case is the validity of the court's ruling that
the Pennsylvania statute of frauds is inapplicable in a conflict of laws situation between state and federal jurisdictions. To resolve this question, it is
first necessary to determine if the statute of frauds of the state where the
contract was made is considered to be substantive or procedural. If substantive, then the agreement is void and remains so wherever the action
is brought. 4 If procedural, the contract is not void but only unenforceable
in the courts of the state where the contract was made. When the contract is under consideration in another jurisdiction, the law of the forum
applies and its fraud provisions must be met.5 After consideration of
1. 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§499a et. seq. (1946).
2. Since the regulations [7 C.F.R. §46.2(s) (1949)] of the Secretary of Agriculture under PACA state that the buyer is deemed to have accepted if he fails to
reject within 24 hours after receipt of notice of arrival of the produce, the court held
that the buyer did not reject in the allotted time and consequently accepted. Receipt and acceptance satisfies the statute of frauds. See dictum in instant case at
529.
3. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 42 (Purdon 1931). "First. A contract to sell or
a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upwards
shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or
choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same,
or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some
note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be
charged or his agent in that behalf."
4. Instant case at 527; Allshouse v. Ramsay, 6 Whar. 331 (Pa. 1841).
5. Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (1852).
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conflicting decisions, the instant court found the Pennsylvania statute to
be procedural, and federal law controlling. 7 Due to the lack of a federal
statute of frauds, the contract was enforced. The case thus stands for the
proposition that when a contract concerning perishable agricultural commodities is made in a state whose Uniform Sales Act statute of frauds is
held to be procedural, the contract need not meet the requirements of the
fraud law.
Although the holding of this case may be correct on the basis of
previous case law, it must be remembered that those cases which held the
statute procedural did so .for a local situation and not for the purpose of
deciding the effect of the statute in a conflict of laws problem.8 In the
latter circumstance, the meaning of procedural is much narrower than
when applied to internal law.9 Comity demands that the concept of procedure in conflicts problems be restricted to a minimum. For practical
reasons, however,, one cannot require a court to unduly hinder and inconvenience itself by temporarily making over its machinery for the administration of justice to resemble the foreign court.' 0 Therefore, comity is
sacrificed for those items which are universally deemed as not affecting
the heart of the suit, i.e., forms of action and right to sue in one's own
name. The statute of frauds does not fall into this category, and, since it
impairs the very right to sue, it should be substantive."
Since the instant court has, nevertheless, held fhe statute to be procedural, it might appear that this decision opens the door to the circumvention of the statute's policy to prevent the establishment of fraudulent
contracts by perjured testimony.' 2 A closer examination of the workings
of the PACA reveals, however, there is little danger of this result. An
initial deterrent upon fraud is the fact that all persons purchasing interstate perishable agricultural commodities must be licensed,18 and the Secretary of Agriculture can with cause suspend or revoke the license.' 4 Loss
of license means a buyer is out of business. All disagreements are heard
6. Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Clegg & Clegg

v. Lees & Lees, 82 Pa. Super. 584 (1924). Contra: Franklin Sugar Refining Co.
v. William D. Mullen Co., 7 F.2d 470 (D.C. Del. 1925); Franklin Sugar Refining
Co. v. Holstein Harvey's Son, 275 Fed. 622 (D.C. Del. 1921).

7. The rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to the effect that

a federal court when hearing cases due to diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional
amount must apply the law as declared by the highest state court of the jurisdiction
in which it sits, is not binding here, since this case is in the federal system because
of an express right granted by PACA. 46 .STAT. 534 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§499e (1946).
8. See note 6 supra.
9. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YAIE L. Rsv.
311, 330 (1923).
10. GoomRIcH, Coxiq-ucr oF LAWS § 77 (2d ed. 1938).
11. GooDRcH, CoxFLicr OF LAWS § 85 supra.
12. Yates v. Skaggs, 187 Tenn. 149, 213 S.W.2d 41 (1949).
13. 46 STAT. 533 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 499c (1946).
14. 46 STAT. 535 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §499h (1946).
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His decisions can be ap.

. trial de novo . . .

except that the findings of fact and order or orders of the Secretary shall
. , 1" The wide acquaintance of
be prima facie evidence of the facts..
the Secretary with the parties through their record in the field and in prior
disputes and the detailed knowledge of all PACA transactions enable him
to judge the merits of the case accurately and readily detect fraud. Thus,
in the light of the peculiar circumstances of the remedy afforded by the
PACA, the Secretary can achieve the basic purpose of the statute without
7
its being enforced.'

Trade Regulation-Resale Price Maintenance-Effect of the
Miller-Tydings Amendment on Status of Non-Contracting Dealers in
Interstate Commerce--Two recent cases have considered the application of state fair trade acts 1 to interstate commerce.
Schweggman Brothers, a partnership operating a super market in
New Orleans, sold Calvert and Seagram's whiskies below the fair trade
prices established by the exclusive distributors in Louisiana for those
products. The partnership had not entered into agreements with these
distributors but had received notices from them of minimum resale price
2
The
schedules in contracts valid under the Louisiana Fair Trade Act.
merchandise was received by the store from wholesalers to whom it was
shipped from points outside the state but the notices of the fair trade prices
15. 46 STAT. 534 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §499e(b) (1946). The statute
also provides that the suit may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction,
which would include a state court, but since a federal question is involved, the suit
may easily be moved into the federal court by the party wishing to avoid the statute
of limitations of the state. The net effect is that all such cases will be tried in the
federal court.
16. 46 STAT. 534 (1930), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §499g(c) (1946).
17. Since the PACA was designed to control the buyer, there is no drastic
penalty on the seller for committing fraud similar to the loss of license imposed on
buyer. Yet the statute of frauds does not prevent seller's lying since it is satisfied
by part payment or receipt and acceptance of the goods. Satisfaction in this manner
has little or no bearing upon the essential terms of the contract, i.e., quantity and
price, out of which fraud arises. Therefore, whether or not the statute is enforced,
the Secretary must still determine to the best of his ability if there has been a perpetration of fraud.
1. Fair trade, or resale price maintenance, is a system by which manufacturers,
producers, distributors or wholesalers may fix the minimum price at which a patented,
trademarked or distinctive article may be sold at wholesale or retail. Fair Trade
Acts in 45 states contain two basic provisions. The first legalizes vertical agreements
fixing resale prices. The second is popularly known as "the non-signers provision"
which binds non-contracting parties to observe the fixed price if they have notice
of such an agreement. "Notice of the fixed price, not contract, is then the heart of
Fair Trade Acts." Schulman, The Fair Trade Acts, 40 YALE L.J. 607, 619 (1940).
A mass of literature has been stimulated by the subject. For a well-chosen bibliography, see Oppenheim, UNFAIR T .AEPRACTIcEs 887-888 (1950).
2. LA. GEN. STAT. 9809, 1 et seq. (Dart 1939).
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were mailed to the store directly from other parts of the country. To
prevent sales by the store below those prices, the distributors obtained
injunctions in the federal district court. On a consolidated appeal, the
Circuit Court held that the Miller-Tydings Amendment 3 to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act 4 removed the Sherman Act as an obstacle to the application of the state fair trade acts to sales in interstate commerce so that the
defendant was enjoinable under the non-signers provision of the Louisiana
Act. Schweggman Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 184 F.2d 11 (5th
Cir. 1950). Cert. granted, Feb. 26, 1951, 19 U. S. L. WEEK 3228.
A subsequent case in another circuit restricted the application of the
non-signers provision of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act. 4a Defendant
Wentling conducted a mail order business with headquarters in Pennsylvania and, having advertised in national publications, sold Sunbeam electric razors below the fair trade price to buyers both in and outside the
state. The Sunbeam Corporation obtained in the federal district court an
injunction against such sales in both intrastate and interstate commerce.
But on appeal the circuit court modified the decree to limit the injunction
to intrastate transactions. The court unanimously held that the MillerTydings Amendment did not apply and that the Commerce Clause prevented the application of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act to interstate
commerce. Sunbeam Corporation v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.
1950). Application for cert. filed, 19 U. S. L. WEEK 3215.
Resale price maintenance, as it existed before the fair trade acts, had
early been declared illegal in interstate commerce by a line of decisions
which in the main turned on the invalidity of the price fixing agreements
under § 1 of the Sherman Act.5 Unenforceability against non-contracting
parties of prices so fixed was by inference then a corollary to the invalidity
of the agreements. The subsequent fair trade acts, confined of course to
intrastate operation, contained two basic provisions validating the agreements and binding non-signers with notice. 6 The Miller-Tydings Amendment merely excepted the agreements from the Sherman Act and did not
provide an explicit, or even readily inferrable,7 authorization for the
3. 50 STAT. 693, (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1948).
4. 26 STAT. 209, (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1948).
4a. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 §§ 7-8 (PuRwoN 1941).
5. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 370 (1911).
Price maintenance practices were also held an unfair method of competition in Federal
Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1921). The MillerTydings Amendment provides that fair trade contracts are not an unfair method of
competition.
6. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. [7352 (1948). Support for this proposition and
an interesting illustration of its consequences are found in Frank Fischer Corp. v.
Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 105, 19 A.2d 454 (1941); 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. R-v. 600
(1941).
7. "It seems clear to me that the majority opinion enlarges and extends the
provisions of the statute to a scope not justified by the legislative language." Dissent
in Schweggman case at 16.
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application to interstate commerce of the non-signer provisions.8 The
proper issue then in both the instant cases is whether anything in federal
law prevents such application of the state acts even though the prior
authority focuses consideration on the Sherman Act which only prohibits
restrictive agreements and attempts to monopolize. But enforcement of a
fixed price by means of a statutory remedy involves no agreement, apart
from those which have been expressly validated. Nor could it readily be
termed an illegal attempt to monopolize, or monopolization, when done
solely by virtue of the state acts which, together with the Miller-Tydings
Amendment, require that the goods be in "free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class." 9 Further, state sanction, indeed
state creation of the power, of notice price fixing is a form of state regulation. It has been indicated that the Sherman Act is not a ban on the
states 10 and hence does not extend to such regulation. Therefore, the
Schweggman holding that the Miller-Tydings Amendment removed all
Sherman Act objections to vertical price fixing under the fair trade laws
should not run afoul of the statute and its former interpretations.
The issue involved in both cases however is broader and, under the
interpretation that a form of state regulation is involved, poses a commerce
clause problem."' The negative implications of that clause which may prohibit state regulations affecting interstate commerce in areas over which
Congress has not exercised control are familiar in our constitutional law.12
"Interstate commerce" has a Janus-like meaning and is distinct in this
context from that which determines the reach of Congressional power. 18
The second sale of goods after shipment from another state as in the
Schweggman case is in itself more removed from interstate commerce than
the transactions involved in the typical cases where the commerce clause
was invoked to defeat state regulations.'" An out-of-state party however,
instigates the control over the resale of goods which are relayed through
the commerce by wholesalers who, under modern business conditions, are
but channels between manufacturers and retailers. In short the impact
8. The court in Schweggman reached the conclusion that the Amendment removed every obstacle to any part of the fair trade acts after refusing to consider the
legislative history. The only prior holding on this question in Pepsodent v. Krauss,
56 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1944) reached the same conclusion only by a studied
examination of the legislative history.
9. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947).
10. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-352 (1943).
11. Liquor is involved in the Schweggman- case. For another problem arising
from the special legal position of this commodity, consider U.S. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
12. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. RFv. 1 (1940);
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 Coi. L. Rv.
547 (1947).
13. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
14. A classification and summary of such cases is provided by Mr. justice Frankfurter dissenting in Hood v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 568 n.2 (1949).
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of the whole situation is, and is designed to be, on interstate commerce.' 5
Where the first resale after interstate shipment or an interstate resale is
involved, as in the Sunbeam case, the effect on the commerce is obvious. 16
Since the state statutes have this effect, the inquiry whether such operation
is prohibited is but the preface to a series of questions. The test of the validity of such state action is presently in doubt. Southern Pacific v. Arizona 17
adduced a balance of interests criterion evolved from a long line of decisions
on varied state controls. But Hood v. DuMond '8 is said to abandon that
test by relying "upon the principle that the State may not promote its own
economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce." 19 Strictly that case merely forbids self-imposed economic isolation
of a state, but its broad language may be read to interdict state sanctioned
resale price maintenance.2 0 Even if "the accommodation of competing
demands" 21 is the extant test, the national interest in preserving competition in the economy may be held to outweigh state desire to protect its
own business elements.
This inquiry also encounters a problem whether there is such silence
on the part of Congress on the subject to make the negative implications
of the commerce clause significant. True, the Sherman Act bans restraints of trade by individuals but not necessarily, as indicated above,
those that are the result of, and sanctioned by, state legislation and which
are accordingly permissible under the Act. If the commerce clause is an
impediment to such restraints imposed by state regulation, Congress has a
recognized power to remove the bar.2 2 In enacting the Miller-Tydings
Amendment its dominant purpose was undoubtedly to effectuate fair trade.23
But its action was merely to except fair trade agreements from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and not to provide an explicit or even readily

15. 'Vhen Congress has not exerted its power under the Commerce Clause,
and state regulation of matters of local concern is so related to interstate commerce
that it also operates as a regulation of the commerce, the reconciliation of the
power thus granted with that reserved to the state is to be attained by the accomodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved" Parker
v. Brown, .upra note 10, at 362.
16. See Note 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 115 (1938).
17. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
18. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
19. Id. at 532. "In this case the Court sets up a new constitutional formula
for invalidation of state laws regulating local phases of interstate commerce." Mr.
Justice Black dissenting, id. at 545. See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting,
id. at 564; Mendelson, Recent Developments in State Power to Regdate and Tax
Interstate Commerce, 98 U. OF PA. L. IrEv. 57 (1949).
20. "The new formula subjects state regulation of local business activities to
greater constitutional hazards than they have ever had to meet before." Mr. Justice
Black dissenting in Hood v. Du Mond, supra, at 545.
21. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, at 769. Under this test the fact
that 45 states have fair trade laws is an important relevant factor.
22. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 CoL L. IEv. 547 (1947).
23. Pepsodent v. Krauss, 56 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1944). It is particularly
noteworthy that the court in the Schwegginan case, both majority and dissent, refused to consider the legislative history since the amendment is unambiguous on its
face. Schweggnmn case at 15, 16.
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inferrable authorization for the application of non-signers provisions which
the commerce clause might otherwise prevent 2 4 Inadequate implementation of legislative motive should provide no basis for increments to state
power.2 5 The result then is silence of Congress and absence of its consent,
as to this phase of the subject. In summary, the Sunbeam case is an
acceptable application of settled constitutional doctrines and serves to
focus a question whether the Schweggman application of state provisions
as to non-signers of fair trade contracts so affects interstate commerce as
2 6

to violate the commerce clause.

These cases are the legal echoes of an economic maelstrom. Fair
trade has stimulated an increasing current of opposition.2 7 "Protection
against loss leaders" is an obsolete slogan when it is recognized that distribution level dissatisfaction with price competition has been and remains
the primary motive of those now supporting the device? 8 In operation,
this price-fixing system precludes consumer participation in potential benefits of marketing efficiency 29 Its purported justification in protection of
small business departs somewhat from the facts and augurs undesirable
consequences.30 Legalized price maintenance compels large retail chains
to use markups unnecessarily high from their viewpoint. The benefits
they thereby derive because their economic power permits Pon-price competitive advantage in advertising, location, etc., perhaps outmeasure their
former advantage of ability to cut prices on fair-traded merchandise, and
so in reality the competitive position of the small merchant has been
aggravated.3 ' The increased return for sellers of fair trade products has
24. See note 7, supra.
25. The Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (1890), was passed by Congress to enable
states to prevent evasions of their liquor control laws by use of interstate commerce.
But in Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898) activities directly contrary to that legislative purpose were permitted by the Court on its interpretation of the Act as passed.
The more familiar "enabling acts" have all been explicit in their grants of power
to the states; e.g. Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 STAT. 899 (1913) ; McCarran Act, 59 STAT,
33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011, 1012, (a) (1948) ; cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U.S. 507 (1947). A principle of strict construction may be distilled from this experience which weighs heavily against implication as the basis of realignment of state and federal power over commerce.
26. This question has been noted but not very comprehensively discussed. See
1 Callman, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 418 (1945); 2 CCH TRADE
REG. REP. 7308 (1948) ; Note, 37 COL. L. Rzv. 1429, 1431 (1937) ; Note, 51 HARv.
I. REv. 336, 344 (1937); Note, 47 MICH. L. REv. 821, 826 (1949); Note, 16
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 115, 119 (1940).
27. 98 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 129 (1949) ; Brecher, The Revolt Against Price Fixing, Consumer's Reports, May 1950, p. 218; N. Y. Times, May 22, 1949, III, p. 1,
col. 3.
28. FTC REP. ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE LIV (1950) (the most extensive
study of the device). Hutchinson, Everybody's Business, Nation, May 3, 1947, p. 518
criticizes "The lengths to which fair-traders carry their propaganda. .. ."
29. Umbreit, MODERN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 556 (1950) ; Schachtman, Resale Price
Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. OF PiTr. L. Rz-v. 562, 589 (1950).
30. Even if accepted, such justification implies a question of basic economic
philosophy as to whether, and to what extent, such protection should be given at the
sacrifice of competition.

See generally NOURSE, PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY,

espec. 42-43, 71-81 (1944).
31. Schachtman, supra note 26, at 579-580. In describing the growth of the
Food Fair chain, it is said that its status among the large chains is sustained in part
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also induced more stores to deal in that merchandise. The anticipated
reaction to this development is agitation by established fair traders for
limitation of the number who may sell those products, a prospect which
32
Small busiis a further derogation of the principles of free enterprise.
ness as an institution then may be ultimately harmed by the system, a
consideration somewhat obscured to the present pressure elements by the
allure of a guaranteed high markup. And of course this satisfaction of
the profit motive is detrimental to the consumer for whom it means
higher prices 33 At the same time, manufacturers, the nominal beneficiaries
34
of price maintenance in the protection of good will of their products, are in
a variety of positions. Some, indifferent to fair trade, must support it
5
Others may manipulate the system
rather than risk retail retaliation.3
36
In any case, fair trade
as an effective tool to evade the anti-trust act.
tends to diminish competition even at the production level and is a far
37
more drastice measure than protection of good will in a product requires.
Proper evaluation of resale price maintenance in reference to the national
interest indicates the system may be grossly out of proportion to the needs
of the interests it advances which are valid. The instant cases afford the
Supreme Court an opportunity to reconsider it in the light of the wisdom
gained from fifteen years experience with fair trade in the national economy.

Unemployment Compensation-Eligibility of an Unemployed
Person Receiving an Industrial Pension-Two unemployed mineworkers brought claims before the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. They had quit their jobs for reasons of
health and applied for lighter work, which was unavailable. Both were
receiving pensions from their previous employer. The Board granted the
claims without examining the pension plan, and on appeal the court remanded the record with directions that the plan be studied. It said that
(1) although a pension is not "remuneration for services" rendering its
by concentration on low-markup items made possible by heavier sales of high-markup
goods. Those specified in the latter category are all fair-traded products. Food
Fair Supernmarkets, Fortune, June 1950, pp. 99, 128.
32. Wallach, The Price of Fixed Prices, Nation's Business, Dec. 1949, p. 31.
33. What might be termed a conservative estimate of the difference between
free-trade and fair-trade prices says the latter "bring the annual national markup
to half a billion dollars." The Not-So-Fair-Trade-Laws, Fortune, Jan., 1949, p. 70.
It is interesting to note that as a result of the article "the outcry . . . was so loud,"
particularly on the part of the National Association of Retail Druggists, that the
magazine published a second article to justify its position. The Fair Trade Controversy, Fortune, April 1949, p. 75. This second article is an excellent summary
of practical arguments against fair trade.
34. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram's Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183
(1936).
35. The Not-So-Fair-Trade-Laws Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70.

36. FTC, op. cit. supra note 25, at LXIV.
37. MuND,

GOVERNMENT AND BusINEss 446-447

(1950).

712

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

recipient ineligible for unemployment compensation, (2) if the pension is
conditioned upon pensioner's withdrawal from the labor market, he is
disqualified from receiving compensation, since he is no longer "available
for suitable work." Keystone Mining Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 167 Pa. Super. 256, 75 A.2d 3 (1950).
Because private industrial pension plans have become numerous only
recently,' the Pennsylvania court seems to have been the first appellate
body to be faced with the issue of a pensioner's eligibility for unemployment compensation. There have been, however, a few decisions rendered
by state compensation boards. 2 In one of these it was decided that receipt
of retirement benefits did not necessarily affect eligibility for unemployment compensation, since recipient might be ready, Willing, and able to
accept suitable work as required by the unemployment compensation law; 3
the fact that he was compulsorily retired from his former employment did
not circumscribe his availability for other work. 4 It has also been held
that receipt of a pension may raise a presumption of withdrawal from the
labor market, and may be an indication that claimant has not made the
required effort to find employment. 5 Other cases involved claimants who
were receiving pensions and who had refused to accept referrals of work
that would pay less than their pensions, or cause their pensions to be
stopped. The respective boards held that since the only existing job
opportunities in the area were of the kind which the claimants would not
accept, they were in fact not available for work, in spite of their apparent
6
willingness to continue working.
The above cases reflect the same interpretation of the unemployment
compensation laws which the present court seemed to adopt, and perhaps
summarily the court dismissed the initial argument that a pension is
"remuneration for wages," thus rendering pensioners ineligible for compensation under the Act.7 Still, its conclusion seems well warranted.
Although unemployment compensation laws were enacted to prevent the
spread of indigency, s need or actual indigency is not a requirement for
eligibility.9 Receipt of income from other sources does not disqualify a
claimant, for the purpose of these laws is to supplement a person's re1. See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 678, 683 (1950).
2. Collected in a publication of the Social Security Board,
PENSATION INTERPRETATION SRVICE: BENEFIT SERIEs
SER.).

UNEMPLOYMENT COM-

(hereinafter abbreviated

BEN.

3. Availability for suitable work is a requirement of every unemployment compensation law; see e.g. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 801d (Purdon, Supp. 1949).
4. BEN. SER., case no. 13433-Colo. (vol. 12, No. 6, 1949).
5. BEN. Sm., case no. 13495-Va. (Vol. 12, No. 6, 1949).
6. BEN. Sm., case no. 13712-N.M. (Vol. 12, No. 9, 1949); BEN. SER., case
no. 13248-Okla. (Vol. 12, No. 3, 1949).
7. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, §§ 753u, 753x (Purdon, Supp. 1949).
8. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 752 (Purdon, 1941); see Susquehanna Collieries
Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 137 Pa. Super. 110, 114, 11
A.2d 880, 882 (1940).
9. See -Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Econwmic Objectives, 55
YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1945).
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sources during periods of unemployment.' 0 Similarly, the Social Security
Act, although it defines old age assistance as payments to needy individuals," does not require recipients to deduct other income (excluding
wages over $15 a month) from benefits to which the Act entitles them.' 2
Furthermore, pensions are not properly "remuneration for services" within
the meaning given that phrase by the unemployment compensation laws.
In other fields of law the contrary has been true, for pension payments
have been held to be "compensation for personal services" subject to
income taxation,' 3 and as "wages" within the meaning of the Taft-Hartley
Act provision that wages are a proper subject for collective bargaining.' 4
But in the unemployment compensation laws, "remuneration for services"
is used not so much to define types of income as to determine when a
person is employed. Many such laws expressly state that retirement
payments are not included in "remuneration for services." :5 Although
the language of the Pennsylvania law is not so clear,' 6 it is plain that a
person who has quit work and is receiving a pension is no longer employed.' 7 So the court found in the instant case. It has been noted by
some writers that, in the case of pensions, employers must not only bear
the double burden of contributing to both pension plans and the unemployment compensation trust fund, but also, because their rate of contribution to the trust fund is measured by their "experience rating," Is
they find their rate of contribution raised whenever compensation is paid to
their ex-employees. In actual practice, however, an employer's experience
rating depends largely on factors outside his control,10 and he may always
avoid the double burden by providing that unemployment compensation
be deducted from pension payments.2 0 The major purpose of unemploy.
10. See Ellickson, Labor's Demand for Real Employnent Security, 55 YALE
L.J. 253, 254-255 (1945).
11. 49 STAT. 622 (1935), as amended, 53 STAT. 1362 (1939), 42 U.S.C. §306

(1946).
12. 53 STAT. 1367-1368 (1939), 42 U.S.C. §403 (1946).
13. Hooker v. Hoey, 27 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
14. Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 170 F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948).
15. See, e.g., 30 CoNso LAws oF N.Y. § 517(2a) (McKinney, 1948).

16. See note 7 supra; but cf. Fazio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489 (1949) in which the court held that voluntary
dismissal payments, grouped with retirement payments in § 753x as not included in
the term "wages," were nevertheless "remuneration" under § 753u.
17. To be eligible for unemployment compensation, a person must have left his
work involuntarily, or with good cause (PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 43, § 802b (Purdon,
Supp. 1949)); good cause has been held to include reasons of health, as in the instant case (Miller Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 570, 45 A.2d
908 (1946)).
18. The better an employer is able to stabilize employment in his business, the
lower his rate will be. For a discussion of experience rating, see Burns, Unemploy-

ment Compensation and Socio-Econornic Objectives, 55
Arnold, Experience Rating, 55 YALE L.J. 218 (1945).

19. See Burns, supra note 9, at 14.
20. See Boycz, CARROLL, How TO PLAN

PENSiONS

YALE

L.J. 1, 6-14 (1945),

31-32 (1950).
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ment compensation itself should be to provide benefits rather than to
impose as few costs as possible on employers. 2'
The second aspect of the problem was considered more at length by
the court. Since availability for suitable work is required by the compensation laws, the terms of a pension may be significant in determining
a pensioner's willingness to accept job opportunities in his area. The
court's opinion requires clarification, however, since the crucial question
is not the terms of the pension per se, but their effect on the pensioner's
state of mind. The average industrial pension plan today is a contract
negotiated by the employer and the union, with employees as third-party
beneficiaries. 22 Thus, whatever the conditions of the pension, pensioners
do not promise in advance to abide by them; rather do they receive payments if they have fulfilled the conditions. Secondly, it would be unrealistic
to dletermine a pensioner's availability for work by considering that the
mere receipt of a pension, especially one conditioned upon partial retirement, signifies retirement. Nor should there even be a presumption to
that effect. Labor in general regards pensions primarily as rewards for
long service and as sources of steady income for persons whose earning
power is reduced by advancing age 2 3 Many pensions are conditioned upon
compulsory retirement from present employment, but such terms are de24
sired by employers as a means of getting rid of superannuated employees,
rather than as a method of forcing pensioners to withdraw from the labor
market. An examination of a number of pension plans reveals none with
requirements such as the instant court imagines. 25 Nevertheless, insofar
as the terms of a pension influences a person's willingness to accept existing job opportunities, they are important, for if in fact a person will not
accept employment paying less than his pension, or which would cause
him to lose his pension, he may not be available for work under the present
law. The court must examine a pensioner's willingness to work in terms
of the existing local labor market, but fundamentally it is the pensioner
himself who should determine his own availability.
United States-The Federal Tort Claims Act-The United States
as a Third-Party Defendant-Plaintiff was injured when the bus on
which he was a passenger collided with a jeep operated by an employee
of the United States. In a negligence action brought against the bus
company, the company filed a third-party complaint seeking to implead the
United States for purposes of contribution. The district court dismissed
the third-party complaint on the grounds that a claim for contribution is
not one for "money damages, for . . . personal injuries or death," which
21. See Bums, vtpra note 9, at 12-13.
22. See Comment, 59 Yale LJ. 678, 683 (1950).
23. Id. at 696.

24. Id. at 695-696.
25. E.g., the pension plans of Bethlehem Steel Co., 5 CCH
ed.)

153301

(1950);

LAB. LAW REP.

General Motors Corp., 5 CCH LAB. LAW REP.

f 53302 (1950) ; Ford Motor Co., 5 CCH

LAB.

LAW REP. (4th ed.)

(4th

(4th ed.)

53303 (1950).

1951]

RECENT CASES

is required by the Act.' This holding was ignored by the appellate court
which affirmed on the separate ground that the Federal Tort Claims Act 2
does not permit impleader of the United States as a third-party defendant
in a suit between private litigants Capital Transit Co. v. United States,
183 F.2d 825 (D. C. Cir. 1950), rezvd, 19 U. S. L. WEEx 4123 (U. S. Feb.
26, 1951).
The instant controversy really involved two distinct issues: 1) Does
the Act permit a suit for contribution? 2) If so, can this remedy be obtained by a private defendant impleading the United States as a third
party defendant under Rule 14 (a) of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?3sWhile there is a conflict of opinion in the federal courts as to
whether an independent action for contribution can be maintained against
the United States under the Act, one court has decided that such a suit
4
is permitted where the substantive law of the forum permits contribution.
The instant court chose to ignore this aspect of the case. It faced only the
problem of whether the United States can be joined with or impleaded
by a private defendant. This matter has been dealt with in cases under
three earlier statutes, waiving sovereign immunity to suit. The Supreme
Court has held that joinder of the United States with a private defendant
could not be accomplished under the Tucker Act since its provisions gave
the district courts jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, which
cannot hear suits between private litigants.5 On the other hand, the
United States can be sued jointly with or can be impleaded by a private
individual under the Suits in Admiralty Act 6 and the Public Vessels
Act." The district courts are split evenly as to whether a plaintiff can
join the United States and a private defendant in order to enforce their
liability as joint tort-feasors under the Tort Claims Act.' The courts which
deny joinder do so by analogy to cases under the Tucker Act, and especially
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b).

(D.D.C. 1949).

Stradiley v. Capital Transit Co., 87 F. Supp. 94

2. 28 U.S.C.A. §§1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412(c),
2671-2680 (1950). Hereinafter referred to as the Act.
3. 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (1950) (when defendant may bring
in third party). This was the only question discussed by the court and consequently
is the problem dealt with in this comment.
4. This issue was raised on a motion to dismiss in Brown & Root v. United
States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 263 (,S.D. Tex. 1950) (contribution denied based on Texas
law). The instant court has permitted contribution between private litigants in a
case similar to the one in question. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
For dicta denying the right of contribution under the Act see Drummond v. United
States, 78 F. Supp. 730, 731 (E.D. Va. 1948) ; Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. United
States, 76 F. Supp. 850, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
5. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a) (2) (1950), United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
6. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq. (1946), The Cotati,
2 F.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)
7. 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §781 et seq. (1946), The Zeller
No. 8, 45 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
8. Permitting joinder: Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md.
1947) ; Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D. N.J. 1947) (dismissed on other
grounds);
Refusing joinder: Donavan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1948);
Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Va. 1948); Uarte v. United
States, 7 F. R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
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by utilizing the doctrine of strict interpretation of sovereignty waiving
statutes; but recent decisions permitting indemnitees to recover under the
Act,9 and a recent Supreme Court holding that the Act allows suits by
subrogees indicate a relaxation of this long-espoused doctrine. 10 Furthermore a circuit court which previously decided the dual problem in question
here, did permit impleader of the United States for purposes of contribution,:1 but the present court both declined to decide whether or not a suit
for contribution at any time may be maintained under the Act and disagreed with the only case in point by holding that the Act does not permit
impleader of the United States. It argued that legislative history and the
possibility of "paradoxical" consequences if this procedure were allowed
"are indicative that Congress did not intend to permit such joinder." 12
Since the language of the Act does not specifically permit nor preclude
impleading the United States as a third-party defendant, and since previous
decisions and the legislative history of the Act actually throw little light
on this problem, 13 it appears that the practical consequences of allowing
or denying the use of impleader under the Act should form the basis for
this decision. In failing to decide whether or not an independent suit for
contribution is permitted under the Act, however, the court denied itself
the only frame of reference in which an accurate appraisal of these consequences can be made. This is so because a holding that the Act does
not permit a suit for contribution would eliminate the impleading problem
entirely; whereas, a holding that contribution is allowed would provide a
means for comparing the practical consequences of impleader with the
correlative consequences of the alternative independent suit for contribution.
The paradoxical results suggested by the court arise mainly because
private litigants are entitled to a jury trial as of right,14 while the Act pro9. United States v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. Co., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir.
1948); Newsum v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
10. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949). The
Court quoted Judge Cardozo's statement in Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co.,
243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926). "The exemption of the sovereign
from suit involves hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not
to add to its rigor by refinement of construction, where consent has been announced."
11. Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950).
12. Instant case at 829. The court used the words, "joinder" and "impleader,"
interchangeably. This is justifiable here since the determination of whether the Act
permits either procedure depends on approximately the same factors. Likewise, the
court utilized previous decisions under the Act which involved only technical joinder.
13. Although the Act is the culmination of twenty-odd years of legislative effort,
its history says little about the problem of joinder or impleader. The little that has
been said on this subject is not helpful. H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong. 3d Sess.
(1940) indicates that the United States shall be liable for only a pro rata share of the
damages where it is a joint tortfeasor. H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1942) recommends that "in cases involving joint tortfeasors the rights and liabilities of the United States will be determined by the local law.' H.R. REP. No.
1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945) states that the bill does not permit any person
to be joined as a defendant with the United States. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1946), the report accompanying the Act as finally enacted, makes no
reference to the problem of joinder or impleader.
14. U.S. CONST. AmEND. Vll. But jury trials were demanded in only about

one-third of the 6,426 civil trials heard in the district courts in 1949.
DRcEoR OF THE ADmiNISTRATIVE

REPORT OF THE
OFFICE OF THE UNITEA) STATES COURTS

94 (1950).
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vides that suits against the United States are to be tried by the Court.15
If, for example, both defendants should attempt to prove only contributory
negligence, it is possible for the jury to impose liability on the private defendant while the judge absolves the United States on the identical defense. 1 Such a conclusion is not paradoxical; rather, it is a logical result
of the very reason for submitting issues to the jury in the first place, i.e.
these are questions of fact upon which reasonable men can differ. Furthermore, the same possibility of inconsistency arises where there is a second
suit for contribution. But the natural impetus toward consistent verdicts,
which would be afforded by the two independent triers of fact hearing
most of the evidence from the same witnesses under the same circumstances, would undoubtedly be non-existent if an independent suit for contribution were required. 17 The likelihood of the judge and jury awarding
different damages, a predicament where the United States and a private
defendant are sued as joint tortfeasors, is not present under third-party
practice since the judge's award of contribution to the third-party plaintiff
is necessarily dependent upon the jury's award to the original plaintiff.' 8
Of course, this utilization of a jury verdict to determine the extent of the
liability of the United States seems to conflict with that section of the
Act which prohibits trial by jury. This fact is an argument against allowing a suit for contribution under the Act, but does not bear on the question
of whether the impleading procedure may be used if contribution is permitted. The odd consequences foreseen by the court are inevitable incidents of a statute which allows governmental redress for private injuries,
but apparently seeks to prevent lay juries from squandering treasury funds.
It seems, however, that any unfavorable results of impleading the United
States for contribution, though possibly significant when considered in
vacuo, are not conclusive, since they might exist even if an independent
suit for contribution were required; whereas, the advantages of impleader
in saving the time, trouble and expense of a second suit definitely favor
its use in this sort of litigation under the Act. 19
15. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2402 (1950).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) allows the third-party defendant to assert all defenses
he might have against the original plaintiff, including those that the third-party
plaintiff may assert.
17. Any difficulties due to the offer of evidence, which would be admissible before the judge but not before the jury, could easily be solved by removal of the
jury during parts of the trial.
18. Where the United States and a private defendant are sued as joint tortfeasors,
and both are found liable, the judge and jury must each determine the amount of
plaintiff's damages. If the awards differ, which, if either, will be conclusive? The
same problem could arise under rule 14(a) if the original plaintiff should amend
his complaint to state a cause of action against the third-party defendant. It should
be noted, however, that this possible inconsistency would be even more likely where
the plaintiff sued the United States and the private individual in separate suits.
19. The increase in the number of cases under the Act, "especially the sharp rise
in the number of motor-vehicle accident cases in 1949," accounts for a large proportion of the increasingly heavy burden on the district courts. REPORT OF THE DIRcTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNIED STATES CoURTs,

45 (1950).

